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Group Dynamics
Cass R. Sunstein
My goal here is to cast some light on a particular puzzle. Why did the
overwhelming majority of Republicans - representatives and citizens
alike - support the impeachment of President Clinton? Why did the
overwhelming majority of Democrats - inside and outside of Congress
- oppose impeachment? Consider some remarkable numbers. In the
House of Representatives, 223 of 228 Republicans, or 98%, voted for
impeachment on at least one count, whereas five of 206 Democrats, or
2%, voted for impeachment on at least one count. In the Senate, 51 of
55 Republicans, or 93%, voted to remove the President from office,
whereas 0 of 45 Democrats, or 0%, voted to remove the President from
office. Within the citizenry, there also were exceedingly sharp divisions,
with the vast majority of Democrats believing that impeachment would
be a mistake, and the vast majority of Republicans believing exactly the
opposite. (Independents typically opposed impeachment and helped pro-
duce the large anti-impeachment numbers among the public as a whole.)
What accounts for this difference?
It is far too simple to say that one group was right and another wrong
(though I believe that this is true'). Whatever the appropriate stance on
the impeachment question, it simply defies belief to suggest that this pat-
tern of judgments is what one would expect if each person, whether
ordinary citizen or legislator, had been consulting his own conscience;
surely independent judgments would have led to far more defections from
the party line. I think that this is particularly true on the Republican side.
Did so many Republicans really believe, in principle, that the President
should be removed from office? But it is plausibly true on the Democratic
side as well. This level of party solidarity is not what one would expect if
people independently were consulting their consciences.
With respect to legislators, as opposed to ordinary citizens, perceived
electoral self-interest undoubtedly played a role. For example, a vote by a
Republican to defect from the party position might have played well with
the general electorate, which was averse to impeachment; but it also
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might have increased vulnerability to a primary challenge within the
party, and in any case, have caused the defector a series of problems with
party leadership. For many Republicans, and for many Democrats, a
defection might have seemed much more trouble than it was worth. But
at least on a straightforward account of electoral self-interest, it is not
plausible to attribute all of these votes to perceived electoral pressures.
Many Republicans and many Democrats would hardly have risked the
political wrath of voters if they had voted otherwise on impeachment. At
least some of them were free to vote as they wished. Some of them prob-
ably would have been helped, not hurt, if they had defected; certainly this
is true for some Republicans, and it defies belief, again, to suggest that it
was not true for any non-defecting Democrats.
Even if we could explain the votes of representatives in terms of elec-
toral self-interest, it remains necessary to explain the sharply divergent
positions of citizens, with the dramatic split between people who identi-
fy themselves with the two parties. Of course, Democrats tend to like
President Clinton much more than Republicans do. But on what ground
would so many self-identified Republicans support impeachment, and so
many self-identified Democrats oppose it?
I believe that much of the answer to the otherwise puzzling pattern of
judgments lies in certain characteristics of collective deliberations -
characteristics that tend to push groups in predictable directions. Above
all, the pattern seems to have a great deal to do with group polarization -
a process that leads groups in a more extreme version of the direction
indicated by their original tendency. An understanding of group polariza-
tion helps explain some alarming behavior by individuals in social
settings. It also sheds some new light on party-line voting. At the same
time, it raises a series of questions and doubts about processes of public
deliberation, especially but not only in the context of highly visible con-
troversies like impeachment.
There is a warning here, for the future, about a political process in
which like-minded people talk principally to one another. The warning is
that this kind of talk can lead to extremism, through entirely predictable
processes; and when various groups go in opposite extreme directions,
misunderstanding, confusion, accusation, and sometimes even violence
may well be the result.
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L Group Polarization
Although it has received little attention in law and political theory,
group polarization is one of the robust findings in social psychology? The
central point here is that the outcome of a group deliberation tends to be
a more extreme version of the tendency indicated by the initial predispo-
sition of group members. Deliberating groups thus move not toward the
middle, but toward within-group extremes. For example, a group of peo-
ple who tend to oppose affirmative action is likely, after discussion, to
oppose affirmative action with some vehemence. Those inclined to sup-
port gun control will, after discussion, do so with great enthusiasm. People
who tend to think well of an ongoing military build-up will strongly favor
a military build-up after discussing the problem with one another. Those
who believe that President Clinton is likely a victim of a concerted right-
wing attack are likely, after talking together, to think that this is
undoubtedly the case. Those who fear that the President is a criminal and
a liar who is protected by an indifferent public and an obsequious media
are likely, after talking together, to believe that this is a very optimistic pic-
ture of the situation, one that is far too favorable to President Clinton.
There are two explanations for group polarization, involving two dif-
ferent mechanisms. Each of the mechanisms plays a role in producing
group polarization and, as we shall see, each of them played a role in the
impeachment debate. The first is based on persuasive arguments. The idea
here is that people respond to the arguments made by others, and the
argument pool, in a group with some initial disposition, will be strongly
skewed in the direction of that disposition. Thus, a group whose mem-
bers tends to oppose affirmative action will hear a large number of
arguments in favor of abolishing affirmative action and a comparatively
fewer number of arguments for retaining it. If people are listening, they
will have a stronger conviction, in the same direction from which they
began, as a result of deliberation. If people believing that President
Clinton's impeachment was a constitutional atrocity speak to one anoth-
er, they will be entrenched in this belief as a result of conversation
together, simply because they will hear a range of arguments to this effect
(and few good arguments the other way). There is considerable empirical
support for the view that the argument pool has this kind of effect on
individual views.
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The second mechanism has to do with social influence. The central
idea here is that people have a certain conception of themselves and a cor-
responding sense of how they would like to be perceived by others. Most
people like to think of themselves as different from others, but only in the
right direction and to the right extent. If you think of yourself as the sort
of person who favors gun control less than most people do (because, let
us say, you think that you are unusually disposed to reject liberal homi-
lies), you might shift your position once you find yourself in a group that
is very strongly in favor of gun control. If you stay where you were, you
may seem less favorably disposed toward gun control than most group
members, and this may be disconcerting, thus producing a shift. Or if
you believe that you have a comparatively favorable attitude toward affir-
mative action, discussion with a group whose members are at least as
favorable as you are might well push you in the direction of greater enthu-
siasm for it. Having heard group members, you might move your stated
position, simply in order to maintain a certain self-conception and repu-
tation, as one who likes affirmative action a bit more than most people
do. If you want to seem to be unfavorably disposed to President Clinton,
and so consider yourself, you may support impeachment in a group that
does the same, not because you have a considered judgment in favor of
impeachment, but because you do not want to seem, in the eyes of the
group, to be a defender of President Clinton. There is a great deal of evi-
dence that social influence is an independent factor behind group
polarization; consider in particular the fact that mere exposure to the
views of others can have this effect, even without any discussion at all.
These points raise many questions about the value of deliberation and
about the whole ideal of deliberative democracy, which lies at the heart of
our constitutional order.' Of course, we cannot say, from the mere fact of
polarization, that there has been a movement in the wrong direction; per-
haps the more extreme tendency is better. But when group discussion
tends to lead people to more strongly held versions of the same view with
which they began, it may be nothing to celebrate. If social influences,
rather than a full appreciation of relevant reasons, incline people in cer-
tain directions, the shifts that result may have very little to do with the
merits. Those who believe in deliberation are likely to be pleased to find
that arguments and reasons have an impact. But if the impact is a prod-
uct of a skewed argument pool, the resulting changes in judgment may be
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a product of happenstance and distortion, rather than better thinking. I
will return shortly to the relationship between the impeachment vote and
group polarization.
I Cascades
The empirical findings on group polarization closely connect to the-
oretical work on social "cascades."4 The question here is why social groups
sometimes move quite rapidly in some direction or another and why
groups of like-minded people may move rapidly toward or against an
extreme outcome, such as impeachment.
A. Information and Informational Cascades
A central point here is that when individuals lack a great deal of pri-
vate information, often they rely on information provided by the
statements or actions of others. If A is unaware whether abandoned toxic
waste dumps are hazardous, he may be moved in the direction of fear if B
seems to think that fear is justified. If A and B believe that fear is justi-
fied, C may end up thinking so too, at least if she lacks independent
information to the contrary. If A, B, and C believe that abandoned haz-
ardous waste dumps are hazardous, D will have to have a good deal of
confidence to reject their shared conclusion. The result of this process can
be to produce cascade effects, as large groups of people end up believing
something - even something that is false - simply because other peo-
ple seem to believe it too.
The same processes should be at work for political, legal, and moral
questions; in fact we easily can imagine political, legal, and moral cascades
- even pro-impeachment and anti-impeachment cascades. The same
process may work for political candidates, as a fad develops in favor of one
or another - a cascade with victory-producing or ruinous consequences.
Sometimes people are not entirely sure whether affirmative action is a
good idea, whether capital punishment should be imposed, whether the
Constitution protects the right to have an abortion, whether it is wrong
to litter or to smoke, whether perjury counts as a high crime or misde-
meanor. Many people, lacking firm convictions of their own, may end
up believing what (relevant) others seem to believe. There is an obvious
analogy here to the persuasive arguments account of group polarization
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- though for cascade effects, what is crucial is the very fact of the belief,
not its grounds.
If the literature on cascades is correct, the White House was right to
be worried about any small shift in public opposition to impeachment. If
(as I suspect) many ordinary citizens were not really sure if the President
should be removed from office, the large percentages who opposed
removal were fragile. A small shift in the direction of pro-impeachment
sentiment - from 70% against to, say, 58% against, and falling - could
have started a cascade effect, if what people thought was dependent on
what (they thought) others thought.
B. Reputation and Reputational Cascades
Thus far the discussion has involved informational pressures and
informational cascades. When information is at work, people care about
what other people think because they do not know what to think, and
they rely on the opinions of others to show what it is correct to think. But
there can be reputational pressures and reputational cascades as well.5
Here people are influenced by what others say and do, not because they
think that those others are likely to be correct (that would be an infor-
mational influence), but because they want to preserve their reputations.
The basic idea is that people care about what others think of them, and
they speak out, or remain silent, partly in order to cultivate the approval
of others, even at the price of failing to say what they really think.
Suppose, for example, that A believes that hazardous waste dumps
pose a serious environmental problem; suppose too that B is skeptical. B
may keep quiet, or even agree with A, not because B thinks that A is right,
but simply in order to preserve Xs good opinion. C may see that A
believes that hazardous waste dumps pose a serious problem and that B
seems to agree with A; C therefore may voice agreement even though pri-
vately she is skeptical or ambivalent. It is easy to see how this kind of
thing might happen with intense political debates. People who believe
that President Clinton is a liar and a criminal might be entirely quiet in
some contexts or even agree wholeheartedly with people who speak out
on President Clinton's behalf. People who believe that impeachment was
a terrible idea might not say so, and even may endorse impeachment, sim-
ply to preserve their reputations in certain communities. Undoubtedly
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this happened among some of those who supported impeachment,
including within the House of Representatives.
The consequence of all this can be cascade effects - large social
movements in one direction or another - when a number of people
appear to support a certain course of action simply because others (appear
to) do so. Here, as with informational forces, what is true for publicly
stated factual claims can be true as well for moral, legal, and political
claims. This phenomenon is of course analogous to the social influence
explanation of group polarization. The only difference is that the social
influence explanation concerns presentation to self as well as presentation
to others.
III The Dynamics of Impeachment
How does all this bear on the impeachment of President Clinton? At
first glance the answer is straightforward, and what has been said thus far
should supply the rudiments of a basic account.
A. The Basic Account
Consider informational forces first. In both Congress and the nation,
Republicans were talking mostly with Republicans; Democrats were talk-
ing mostly with Democrats. The result of these two largely independent
sets of deliberations was to deepen the Republicans' commitment to
impeachment, to heighten the sense that the President had indeed
committed a high crime, to suggest that the President's arguments were
weak and self-serving - and at the same time, to strengthen the sense,
among Democrats, that Judge Starr was an unprincipled zealot, that the
grounds for impeachment were implausible, and that this was something
not very far from a coup d'etat on the part of the far right.
To be sure, many diverse arguments were available to representatives
and citizens alike; it was not as if the pro-impeachment or anti-impeach-
ment case was invisible to those who disagreed with it. But it does seem
reasonable to think that many Republicans, perhaps especially among the
citizenry, were affected by a distorted argument pool, in which all or most
of the articulated points had to do with the President's violation of his
oath of office and failure to tell the truth under oath. In the relevant dis-
cussions, the best arguments on the President's behalf appeared
HeinOnline  -- 12 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 135 2000
infrequently, and when they appeared, they were likely to have been made
half-heartedly. Many discussions among Democrats were affected by a
similar skewed pool of arguments, in which the best claims on behalf of
impeachment were not mentioned. No wonder that both groups would
tend to polarize toward a more extreme version of views originally held.
Social influences and reputational forces were undoubtedly at work as
well. A Republican who rejected impeachment - whether representative
or citizen - would be signaling that he was a certain sort: one who was
willing to defect from the general party-line view that serious misconduct
by the President warranted removal from office. Any particular
Republican could be sending out a large signal of tolerance for illegality
and misconduct by high-level Democrats. Indeed, the signal could be far
more dramatic and extreme than anything the defector might have
intended. And for representatives in particular, the consequence could be
severe reputational sanctions, both within the House of Representatives
and at the next election. If a range of Republicans could be convinced to
reject impeachment, the signal would of course be muffled, and perhaps
a cascade of anti-impeachment votes would be expected. There is safety
in numbers. But the collective action problem was quite serious; without
concerted action by a nontrivial number of Republicans, any particular
defector would be in potential trouble.
The same dynamic was at work for any Democrat who favored
impeachment. The signal would be one of capitulation to a Republican
witch-hunt - a signal that would be all the louder if very few Democrats
were defecting. Once defections started, they could be hard to stop,
because after a certain tipping point, the loud signal would be muffled.
Thus, if a few Democrats had called for impeachment, a cascade could
happen here as well. This was the White House's worst nightmare; it
explains why the White House believed it indispensable to keep as many
Democrats as possible in line.
Here, then, is my basic account of the extraordinary party-line judg-
ments among the citizenry at large, and also of the votes in both the
House and the Senate. These were case studies in group polarization.
Those who spoke with one another fortified their own preexisting views
and made them all the more extreme. In this light, it should be unsur-
prising to find the change of heart from Republicans, such as Henry
Hyde, who initially contended that impeachment should occur only if
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there was bipartisan support for it. Once the logic of group polarization
set in, this moderate view was bound to shift.
B. Of Representatives and Constituents
Of course, there are some differences between the legislative process
and the contexts in which group polarization has been studied, above all
because members of Congress are subject to external political sanctions.
Even if members are persuaded that a certain course of action makes best
sense, they may vote otherwise simply because of what their constituents
want. Hence a limited argument pool, for members of a particular party,
may matter much less than a clear signal from people back home. This
point may explain some of the defections on both sides; certainly it
explains why some members are able to resist party pressures and the logic
of group polarization. Unambiguous electoral signals can be a powerful
buffer against that logic (though for reasons I have given, the signals
themselves may be a function of group polarization within the electorate).
The same point bears on the relevance of social influence. Members
of the Republican Party are likely to care a great deal what fellow
Republicans think of them; but they probably care still more about what
local voters think of them. To be sure, the two are not independent of one
another. If a certain Republican seems like an outlier among Republicans
generally - for example, if he seems less sympathetic to impeachment
than his colleagues - his electoral prospects might be damaged simply by
virtue of this signal. But analytically the two are different. Here too the
votes of constituents may matter more than group deliberations (taking
members of the same party as the relevant group).
Because of the differences between representatives and constituents, it
is even reasonable to think that polarization is likely to be more serious
among the latter rather than the former. We can imagine a society - and
it is not so far from our own - in which Republicans speak mostly with
each other, at least about the issue of whether President Clinton should
be impeached; we can imagine a society in which, on the same issue,
Democrats speak mostly with one another too. If this is the situation,
polarization should occur within political camps. Republicans will veer
pro-impeachment; Democrats will veer anti-impeachment. Of course,
there are multiple independent reasons why this may be so. Democrats
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tend to like President Clinton, and Republicans tend not to like him. But
part of electoral polarization, on the question of impeachment, is
undoubtedly a result of the social mechanisms discussed here.
IV Conclusion andA Warning
What lessons do these points have for party dynamics, especially in
the context of highly visible public debates? Certainly they do not explain
all of the picture. But they provide part of any account of why a vast
majority of Republicans may think one thing and a vast majority of
Democrats the opposite, when independent judgments by members
would seem to make this pattern entirely inexplicable. For representatives,
simple electoral calculations undoubtedly play a role; but a great deal
depends on the limited information pool in the relevant communities and
the particular signal given by defectors from the party. In the context of
impeachment, I do believe that this helps explain an otherwise very puz-
zling set of judgments, perhaps above all the remarkable solidity of
Republican pro-impeachment judgments in circumstances in which the
Constitution and large percentages of the public seemed to argue in the
other direction. And if the explanation contains some truth, it helps
account for party-line thinking more generally, within legislatures and
within the citizenry - and raises a host of questions and doubts about
the value and the consequences of group deliberation.
Of course, nothing I have said here demonstrates that group polar-
ization moves people in bad directions. We can imagine many contexts in
which it is entirely appropriate for people to end up with a stronger ver-
sion of their initial position; perhaps discussion clarifies matters, and
perhaps the argument pool, limited though it inevitably is, makes people
see things in a more reasonable light. But nothing in the mechanisms that
underlie polarization makes this inevitable. The most serious problems
are likely to arise when deliberating groups, insulated from one another,
polarize to more extreme positions partly because of their very insulation.
In these circumstances, large groups - with initial tendencies that are
different but not so very different - can shift in extreme opposite direc-
tions, with little understanding of how it is that they have ended up in
such different positions. It is in this setting that group polarization carries
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a risk of balkanization, confusion, and even violence.
The nation managed to avoid the worst of these problems in connec-
tion with impeachment, though in my view members of both parties -
the Republicans even more than the Democrats - suffered a great deal
from their failure to engage the arguments put forth by the other side. If
there is a warning here, there is therefore a lesson as well, about the need
for deliberating groups to avoid the forms of insulation that can lead
them, by the laws of social interaction, in unjustifiably extreme directions.
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